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▶ Introduction
▶ One Time pad - Stream Ciphers
▶ Block Ciphers - Operation Modes
▶ Hash function
▶ Symmetric Cryptanalysis: Foundation of Trust




▶ Cryptography : hiding/protecting information against
malicious adversaries.
▶ Main aims:

















Without needing a previous meeting:
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Asymmetric vs Symmetric Cryptography
Asymmetric:
• Advantage: No need of key exchange.
• Disadvantage: Computationally costly.
Symmetric:
• Disadvantage: Need of key exchange.
• Advantage: Performant, adapted to constrained
environments.
⇒ Use asymmetric for key exchange, and next use
symmetric!!.
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Security of Encryption Algorithms
Asymmetric (e.g. RSA) (no key exchange/computationally costly)
Security based on well-known hard mathematical
problems (e.g. factorization).
Symmetric (e.g. AES) (key exchange needed/efficient)
Ideal security defined by generic attacks.
Need of continuous security evaluation (cryptanalysis).
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Generic Attacks on Ciphers
▶ Security provided by an ideal cipher defined by the best
generic attack:
exhaustive search for the key in 2|K|.
▶ Recovering the key from a secure cipher must be
infeasible:




A primitive is considered secure as long as no attack better
than generic attacks on it is found.
Cryptanalysis: looking for these other attacks.
(we will see more about this later)
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One Time Pad & Stream Ciphers
One Time Pad
▶ One Time Pad: provides perfect secrecy.
With a completly random key K
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⇒ all C are equally likely,
but needs a secret key as long as the message!!
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OTP with shorter keys?
Solution:
▶ From a shorter secret seed k, generate a “long”
sequence (keystream) indistinguishable from random
if we don’t have the seed k
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Stream Ciphers
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▶ Launched by European network ECRYPT 2005-08
▶ Conception of new dedicated stream ciphers
▶ 37 submitted algorithms
▶ 8 in final portfolio, only 6 unbroken now...
Seems difficult - how could it be easier? ⇒ Block ciphers
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Ex. Trivium (eSTREAM portfolio)










EK is composed of a round transform repeated through
several similar rounds.
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Block ciphers - Two main families
▶ Feistel constructions:
▶ SPN constructions: transform the whole state:
• Substitution layer (S-boxes, non-linear)




▶ Key schedule: generates subkeys for each round from
the secret key.
▶ A block cipher is a family of permutations parametrized
by the key.
What to do when:





▶ Problem: equal Ptxts generate equal Ctxts
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Operation Modes: CBC [EMST’76]
▶ Proven secure if the block cipher is secure and if the




▶ ”In a room with 23 people, there is a 50% chance of
having two colliding dates of birthday”.
Intuitive explanation:
23 people ⇒ 23×222 pairs.
With 2n/2 elements we can build about 2n pairs (so we have
a good chance of finding a collision).
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Back to modes
CBC: Careful with Recommendations
Sweet-32 attack [BL’16], based on finding a collision in the
internal state:
For ciphers of 64 bits, we can find a collision in about 232
encrypted blocks, and recover the plaintext.
Possible because the security recommendations were not
respected.
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Operation Modes: CTR[DH’ 79]
▶ Proven secure if the block cipher is secure and if the




AES Competition and Winner
Launched by NIST to find a succesor of DES 97-00.
15 submissions, 1 winner: Rijndael [Daemen-Rijmen 97]
AES:
▶ SPN cipher.
▶ 10/12/14 rounds for 128/192/256-bit keys.
▶ Block of 128 bits.
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AES Round Function




In order to provide confidentiality and authenticity:
▶ Authenticated encryption:
▶ Caesar competition finished this year.




H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}ℓh
• Given a message of arbitrary length returns a short
’random-looking’ value of fixed length.
• Many applications: MAC’s (authentification), digital















Security requirements of hash functions
▶ Collision resistance
Finding two messages M and M′ so that
H(M) = H(M′) must be ”hard”.
▶ Second preimage resistance
Given a message M and H(M), finding another
message M′ so that H(M) = H(M′) must be ”hard”.
▶ Preimage resistance
Given a hash H, finding a message M so that
H(M) = H must be ”hard”.
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Security requirements of hash functions?
A strict definition of ”hard”:
▶ Collision resistance
• Generic attack needs 2ℓh/2 hash function calls ⇒
any attack requires at least as many hash function calls
as the generic attack.
▶ Second preimage resistance and preimage resistance
• Generic attack needs 2ℓh hash function calls ⇒
any attack requires at least as many hash function calls
as the generic attack.
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Why Preimage Resistance? Example
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Why Collision Resistance? Example
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Why 2nd Preimage Resistance? Example
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Iterative Hashing
▶ Difficulty to create algorithms with an arbitrary length
input: concept of iterative hashing.
▶ The message is split into blocks. Typically, an iterative
hash function can be defined by:
a compression function, that takes a chaining value and
a message block and generates a new chaining value.
an construction, that defines how to iterate the
applications of the compression function.
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Padding the message
▶ Cut the message in blocks of fixed length.
▶ If the length of the message is not a multiple of the
size of the block?
• we can not just complete it with zeroes:
• 00010 and 0001000 can produce a collision.
▶ Ex. of sound padding: Add ’1’ in the end, next add
’0’s until completing the block.
▶ Strengthened padding: includes the message length.
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Construction: Merkle-Damg̊ard [MD’79]
▶ Apply iteratively a compression function f
▶ Collision-resistance proof: if f is collision resistant,









































































▶ Based on a permutation P .
▶ Sponge proof of indifferentiability: if P is a
random permutation, then the hash function is
indifferentiable from a random oracle.
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SHA-3 Competition
A NIST competition for looking for a hash standard
replacement of SHA-1.
▶ From 2008 to 2012.
▶ 64 initial submissions
▶ 1 winner: Keccak
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Keccak [Bertoni et al. 08]
• |State| = 1600 bits























































Cryptanalysis: Foundation of Confidence
Any attack better than the generic one
is considered a “break”.
▶ Proofs on symmetric primitives need to make
unrealistic assumptions.




Studies the security of cryptographic primitives.
AKA: Trying to break the primitives, to find attacks:
Empirical measure of security.
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Cryptanalysis and Confidence
Security by knowledge and not by obscurity → only good
way to go.
▶ Primitives are known to the general public ⇒ their best
existing cryptanalysis should also be known,




▶ Competitions (AES, SHA-3, eSTREAM, CAESAR).
▶ New needs: lightweight, FHE-friendly, easy-masking.
⇒ Many good proposals/candidates.
▶ How to choose?
▶ How to be ahead of possible weaknesses?
▶ How to keep on trusting the chosen ones?
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Cryptanalysis: Foundation of Confidence
When can we consider a primitive as secure?
• A primitive is secure as far as no attack on it is known.
• The more we analyze a primitive without finding any
weaknesses, the more reliable it is.
Design new attacks + improvement of existing ones:
▶ essential to keep on trusting the primitives,
▶ or to stop using the insecure ones!
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What can an attacker do?
We can consider the attacker to have access to:
▶ Known Ciphertexts (KPA)
▶ Known Plaintexts (KCA)
▶ Chosen Plaintexts (CPA)
▶ Chosen Ciphertexts (CCA)
▶ Adaptative-Chosen Plaintexts...(ACPA)
In general: we expect the primitives to resist attacks in the
strongest possible non trivial setting.
49/67
On weakened versions
If no attack is found on a given cipher, what can we say
about its robustness, security margin?
The security of a cipher is not a 1-bit information:
• Round-reduced attacks.
• Analysis of components.
⇒ determine and adapt the security margin.
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Ex.: Advanced Encryption Standart
Winner: AES-128, 10 rounds.
▶ 1998: best internal attack: 6 rounds.
▶ 2001: new attack on 7 rounds.
▶ 2001 to 2018: more than 30 new attacks, improving
complexity.
▶ 2018: best known attack is still on 7 rounds. Best
complexity: 297 data, 299 time and 298 memory [DFJ12].
”The hard problem here is to break AES” (Anne Canteaut)
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On high complexities
When considering large keys, sometimes attacks breaking
the ciphers might have a very high complexity far from
practical e.g.. 2120 for a key of 128 bits.
Still dangerous because:
• Weak properties not expected by the designers.
• Experience shows us that attacks only get better.
• Other existing ciphers without the ”ugly”properties.
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On very high complexities
Attack complexity reduced by one or two bits regarding
generic attack:
▶ When determining the security margin: find the highest
number of rounds reached.
▶ Security redefinition when a new generic attack is found
(e.g. accelerated key search with bicliques [BKR 12]).
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On weaker scenarios
Key recovery, state recovery, plaintext recovery vs ...
Distinguishers are dangerous: e.g. to decide between only
two possible plaintexts.
Related-keys might be dangerous, depending on the use of




Collision, preimage, second-preimage vs ...
Distinguishers, compression function collisions, semi-free
start collisions... (might invalidate proof assumptions).
In general, most of the cases might be seen as non-expected




Recommendations should be respected. For example:
▶ Flame [2012]: collisions on MD5[WFL2004].
▶ Attaque sur TLS[ABP..13]: Bias of RC4[FMS01].
▶ Sloth[BL16]: collisions on MD5[WLF2004].




Given an input difference between two plaintexts, some












Differential: input and output difference (∆X,∆Y ).
Differential probability:
PX,K[EK(X)⊕ EK(X +∆X) = ∆Y ] (vs 2−n).
Chosen Plaintext Attacks. Provides a distinguisher.
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Differential paths
▶ Differential path = configuration of differences in the
internal state through rounds.
▶ Each differential path has a probability of being verified.
▶ Easier to compute a priori: hypothesis of stochastic
equivalence: consider the rounds independent:
compute the differential probability of a path by
multiplying the probability of each round.
▶ The S-box DDT provides, for all α and β:
DDT [α, β] = #{x|S(x+ α) + S(x) = β
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Probability of differential: sum of all the differential paths.
Hard to determine. Try to approximate by the highest
probability ones...
Many hypothesis: actually, rounds are not independent, for
some keys it (not always) behaves like a random key...
⇒ Importance of implementing attacks (or reduced-round
attacks) in order to verify theoretical assumptions.
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Last round attacks: key recovery
R-round differential(∆X,∆Y ) of high probability
⇓
attack R+ n rounds of the cipher.
1. Find many pairs with input difference ∆X.
2. Encrypt each of them for R+ n rounds of the cipher.
If the partial decryption of the last n rounds leads to a
difference ∆Y frequently enough, then the key bits involved
are the correct ones with high probability.
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Differential Cryptanalysis









▶ The dual of differential cryptanalysis:
▶ Exploit the existence of (highly) biased affine relations
between some plaintext and ciphertext bits.
▶ This bias can be used to mount a distinguisher or even










is verified with high bias 2−ε:
Pb = 12(1± 2
−ε),




▶ Big number of (very) technical improvements.
▶ Many variants: last-round, multiple, multidimensional,
zero correlation,...
We are always looking at how to improve the complexities,




▶ Permutaton-based primitives (sponge family)
▶ Lightweight primitives ⇒ new NIST competition





▶ Many new needs/ scenarios
▶ Cyptanalysis: new techniques, improvements, families.
A never ending task.
▶ Better safe than sorry!
▶ To be continued on Friday with Lightweight Primitives
and Cryptanalysis.
67/67
